The Social Contract

An Argumentative Essay

The ultimate premise of the social contract is the definition of the relationship between an individual's freedom and state authority. Many thinkers have attempted to draw a line between the two in an effort to identify the most socially optimal balance. Hobbesian thought believes in the need of an absolutist state to overcome the naturally selfish and violent individual. In contrast, Classical liberalism (Locke) believes in the limitation of the state, empowered by the consent of its people, to support the natural rights of the naturally well-intentioned individual. Importantly, the social contract's primary foundation – the relationship between the individual and the state – is heavily dependent on the perceived innate qualities of humans. Logically, the need for a restrictive government will vary vastly depending on the characteristics of the people being governed.

Ultimately, though the ideal relationship of the state and the individual is inherently flawed, a constitutionally-limited republic that provides powerful incentives not only to government officials, but also to its people, in an effort to motivate socially beneficial decisions is the foundation of an ideal society. However, although this structure may prolong the benefit of government, just like any other structure, its longevity entirely depends on both the quality of its constructors and the quality of its people for the span of its inevitably-finite life.

First, for the same reasons that authoritarian or authoritarian-adjacent governments fail (namely, the susceptibility to bad actors), any state is doomed to fail; the only difference being that the highly centralized nature of authoritarian governments expedites failure. In other words, because humans are innately corruptible, it is only a matter of time before any organization, including a state, fails. This has held true since the beginning of human civilization; conscientious leaders give forth to prosperity, only for it to be dismantled by ill-intentioned actors. Ironically, prosperity itself often brings out the corruption in people, or, at the very least, allows for bad actors to rise in power – a product of complacency. Therefore, it is essential for any potential government to put up safeguards against corruptors, not to preserve the state perpetually, for this is an impossible task, but to prolong its benefits.

Aside, before one can conjure an ideal government, naturally, it is imperative to define the overarching goal of the government. Different ideologies define this goal differently. For the purposes of this essay, let the goal of the government be defined as the overall benefiting of the governed – what makes its people the best off. Of course, this is completely subjective and begs the unanswerable question: what does it mean to be better off? In an effort to be more definitive and to acknowledge the differences in people’s self-interest, let the success of a government be defined as the percent who approve of it (Importantly, this is not the same as the susceptible-to-misinformation approval rating. This metric is not meant to be numerically quantifiable, but rather the subjective approval of the governed, assuming they are perfectly informed).

Nevertheless, in an effort to restrict future corruption, it is of absolute importance to declare a constitution that aligns the incentives for both parties (the governed and the governors). Excluding the obvious need for well-intentioned writers of said constitution, any effective constitution must limit power greatly, while not interfering with a government’s growth and the growth of technology. Axiomatically, it is impossible to foresee technological and societal developments that a constitution may interfere with or overlook. Thus, one may come to the accurate conclusion that an effective constitution must use a significant amount of interpretive language (think “reasonable”), almost circumventing the entire point of a constitution: to act as a limit to destructive action, unsusceptible to malicious intent. The list of problems regarding a constitution continue: What happens to those who circumvent the constitution if they’re the supposed protectors of it? If amendments are necessary, how can you prevent malicious altercations? Naturally, an individual may try to attempt to “patch” these issues individually, but, because humans are innately corruptible and factors, both external and future, are unpredictable, any constitution is flawed. Regardless, assuming it was made with positive intentions and was supported by the governed, the soft safeguards put forth by a constitution will prolong the benefits of a government, for exploitation becomes more difficult.

Though, a constitution is meaningless without officials who can act on behalf of the people and quickly react to events and the actions of others. For this, while similarly flawed, a representative republic is the most realistic compromise between one-ruler authoritarianism and direct democracy. Obviously, one-ruler authoritarianism is the epitome of centralization, hence its susceptibility to bad actors. Logically, absolutism motivates malice as the lack of consequences allows for unchecked behavior. Yet, because of errors in the rationale of the masses, like the inability to acknowledge and disregard misinformation/deception, the priority of short-term prosperity over long-term success, and the unfounded influence of emotion in decision-making, any democratic process must be imperfect. However, where a direct democracy completely fails in practicality and efficiency, a republic succeeds slightly more. While one may argue that a republic is more centralized, contradicting the previous anti-centralized argument, this perspective fails to acknowledge the idealism present in a completely decentralized decision making process. In other words, while highly-centralized systems are especially vulnerable, a centralized body is more efficient. Thus, it is necessary to discern a point between the two extremes that is the best. Trade-offs are necessary in a realistic world. In an ideal republic, the elected officials make selfless, more-informed decisions than in a direct democracy, ultimately contributing to an efficient government.

Unfortunately, this seldom happens. Politicians aren’t incentivized to think long term, but rather for the remainder of their term. Moreover, in a world where money is very influential, politicians make decisions not based on what is best for the people, but what is most beneficial to themselves (hence the efficacy of lobbying). Additionally, elected representatives still suffer from the errors in the opinion of the masses. Again, an effort can be made to curb these negative incentives in favor of positive ones, but, as humanity has proven time and time again, the complete alignment of incentives is impossible as environments change and needs evolve. Arguably, even if all variables stayed constant, it is impossible to set effective incentives – different people are motivated by different things (money, power, etc.)

However, for as long as humans are flawed, governments will be flawed, for humans, by nature, form the foundation of any government.

Ultimately, the entire basis of government grew out of the evolutionary need to improve cooperation, outgrowing informal systems. As humans continued to develop, so did the need for a more expansive structure. Therefore, the instant a government fails to fulfill its intended purpose – to facilitate cooperation through order – progress ceases and the same innate human needs that propped up the government turn against it.